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FOREWORD: COMPENSATED SURROGACY IN THE 
AGE OF WINDSOR 
Kellye Y. Testy* 
Having my baby, what a lovely way of saying how much you 
love me; Having my baby, what a lovely way of saying what 
you’re thinking of me . . . .1 
 
When Paul Anka sang those chart-topping words in 1974, the first 
sperm bank had recently opened in New York City,2 and it would still be 
four years before Louise Brown, the first “test-tube” baby, was born in 
England3 and yet another eight years before the now-famous Baby M 
was born.4 In celebrating his wife’s traditional pregnancy, Anka’s song 
achieved a rare coup—topping both the Billboard Hot 100 and many 
lists of the worst songs ever.5 The song made people of many different 
viewpoints commonly uncomfortable. Feminists and other liberal 
thinkers criticized it as misogynistically claiming male dominance 
(“my,” not “our” baby) and seeming to value women only for their 
capacity to reproduce.6 At the same time, religious and conservative 
thinkers took exception to its cavalier approach to abortion (“[d]idn’t 
have to keep it . . . [y]ou could have swept it from your life”).7 
The song’s controversy has not abated with time; rather, it continues 
* Dean, University of Washington School of Law. 
1. PAUL ANKA, (YOU’RE) HAVING MY BABY (Capitol Records 1974). 
2. Ellen Frankfort, Deposits & Withdrawals: The Finances of Sperm, VILLAGE VOICE (Oct. 29, 
1971), available at http://blogs.villagevoice.com/runninscared/2011/01/new_yorks_first.php.  
3. The World’s First Test Tube Baby, PBS.ORG, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/ 
features/general-article/babies-worlds-first/ (last visited Aug. 25, 2014). 
4. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988), aff’g in part rev’g in part, 525 A.2d 1128 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987). 
5. Chaz Kangas, Paul Anka’s “Having My Baby”: Disgustingly Misogynist or Unfairly 
Maligned?, VILLAGE VOICE (May 24, 2013), http://blogs.villagevoice.com/music/2013/05/ 
paul_anka_having_my_baby.php. 
6. Id. 
7. Id. (quoting PAUL ANKA, supra note 1). 
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to stir debate.8 The raw and lasting nerves the song has touched are not 
unlike those set on edge by the topic of surrogacy, especially 
compensated surrogacy.9 The surrogacy debate begins with the issues of 
sex, gender, reproduction, children—already individually and 
intersectionally heavily laden with cultural contest—and adds issues of 
money and commerce. Compounding matters further, add the twenty-
first century issues of fast-paced technological innovation and 
increasingly global markets that are affecting every area of life. There is 
no easy place to stand amid such a turbulent swirl. 
Like Anka’s song, compensated surrogacy also makes people of many 
different political and ideological persuasions commonly uncomfortable. 
For example, many feminist, critical race, and social justice theorists 
continue to raise concerns that compensated surrogacy subjugates 
women, especially women of color and poor women.10 At the same time, 
progressives are uncomfortable restricting the liberty of a woman to 
choose how to use her own body11 or insisting that her labor be done 
only as charity.12 Likewise, few progressives are comfortable restricting 
the availability of surrogacy when it is well known that it often supports 
the formation of nontraditional families, such as parenting by gay men.13 
Surrogacy’s disruption of the heteronormativity and essentialism of 
traditional parenting roles cannot be underestimated, although it 
reinforces a pervasive norm of genetic connection as most desirable for a 
parent-child relationship. Were the genetic connection to a child less 
privileged, adoption would be a readily available substitute for surrogacy 
for those persons wishing to parent but not willing or able to birth a 
child.14 
Progressive thinkers are not the only ones searching for a foot-hold on 
this difficult issue. Ordinarily, conservative thinkers would be strong 
supporters of markets and little concerned with the commodification of 
8. Id. 
9. Surrogacy can be altruistic or commercial, although this distinction is less sharp when altruistic 
surrogates are paid their “reasonable and necessary” expenses. Some of those expenses can start to 
look very much like compensation.  
10. Catherine London, Advancing a Surrogate-Focused Model of Gestational Surrogacy 
Contracts, 18 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 391, 404, 405, 407 (2012). 
11. Id. at 406. 
12. Id.  
13. Mark Hansen, As Surrogacy Becomes More Popular, Legal Problems Proliferate, ABA J. 
(Mar. 1, 2011, 5:40 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/as_surrogacy_becomes_ 
more_popular_legal_problems_proliferate.  
14. For a good example of adoption’s wide availability and access, see THE DONALDSON 
ADOPTION INST., http://adoptioninstitute.org (last visited Nov. 16, 2014).  
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labor.15 To push the issue, what, for instance, is worse about paying a 
woman to have a child than paying a woman for sex work or to work in 
sweat-shop conditions sewing athletic wear? But for conservatives and 
other thinkers who want to draw a clear line against “selling babies,” is 
compensated surrogacy really all that far away? While surrogacy 
supporters are careful to distinguish surrogacy from “selling babies,”16  
it is difficult to argue that the intended parents are paying for anything 
other than a baby. The benefit of the bargain is getting a baby and the 
only exchange that will complete the contract to the intended parents’ 
satisfaction. 
The examples above are but the tip of the iceberg in exploring the 
challenging and interesting questions of law, ethics, and policy raised by 
compensated surrogacy. Those questions are further complicated by 
wide variation among individual states’ approaches to the regulation of 
compensated surrogacy.17 The authors in this timely symposium tackle 
the many and varied issues related to compensated surrogacy with 
sophisticated, diverse, and careful analysis. Moreover, they do so in the 
context of fast-paced legal and sociological change on issues of marriage 
and parenting, some of which was crystalized in the recent United States 
v. Windsor18 decision that spurred growing recognition of gay marriage 
and families across the nation. 
Noting that compensated surrogacy has “implications for every area 
of feminist concern,”19 Ms. Sarah Ainsworth’s helpful contribution to 
the symposium details the process she and others went through to 
develop a feminist framework for addressing surrogacy.20 Ms. 
Ainsworth notes that feminist viewpoints were largely missing when 
Washington State banned compensated surrogacy in 1989,21 and did not 
15. See, e.g., Elizabeth Anderson, Is Women’s Labor a Commodity?, 19 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 71 
(1990); Rebuplican Platform: Restoring the American Dream: Economy & Jobs, GOP.COM 
https://www.gop.com/platform/restoring-the-american-dream/. 
16. See, e.g., Richard J. Arneson, Commodification and Commercial Surrogacy, 21 PHIL. & PUB. 
AFF. 132, 133, 148–49 (1992) (“tentatively” arguing that “commercial surrogacy should be legally 
permissible” and clarifying that creating a market for surrogacy and adoption services is not “baby-
selling”). 
17. Peter Nicolas, Straddling the Columbia: A Constitutional Law Professor’s Musings on 
Circumventing Washington State’s Criminal Prohibition on Compensated Surrogacy, 89 WASH. L. 
REV. 1235, 1239–45 (2014). 
18. __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
19. Sara L. Ainsworth, Bearing Children, Bearing Risks: Feminist Leadership for Progressive 
Regulation of Compensated Surrogacy in the United States, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1077, 1078 (2014). 
20. Id. at 1079–80. 
21. Id. at 1078–79. 
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enter the debate until a gay male legislator—and father of three children 
born to a surrogate mother—proposed lifting the ban in 2010.22 That 
effort failed, but it provided Ms. Ainsworth and her then-employer, 
Legal Voice, an opportunity to develop a thoughtful approach to the 
issue. Ms. Ainsworth cogently explains the framework Legal Voice 
adopted after two years of community engagement and careful study, 
one based on anti-essentialist analysis and pragmatic feminism.23 She 
also urges feminist advocates toward greater leadership in surrogacy 
regulation and to seek reproductive justice in the growing field of 
assisted reproduction.24 
Professor Khiara M. Bridges tackles the effects of the Windsor 
decision on parenting, asking whether critical race theorists opposing 
surrogacy should reconsider their concerns in light of social and legal 
progress for gay and lesbian families who are often the beneficiaries of 
surrogacy contracts.25 She notes that the Justices in Windsor expressed 
strong concern for the welfare of the children of same-sex marriage, 
which begs the question of how those children will come to be.26 To the 
degree she sees Windsor as legitimating the children of same-sex 
couples, she asserts that it likewise de-legitimates laws that frustrate the 
formation of same-sex families. Her essay focuses on laws that prohibit 
the enforceability of surrogacy contracts, and she provides insight into 
the probable racial effects of compensated surrogacy.27 
While being clear that white people are the primary consumers of 
advanced reproductive technologies, including surrogacy, Professor 
Bridges also notes that surrogates do not tend to be uneducated, poor, or 
racial minorities despite early fears that compensated surrogacy might 
lead to a breeder class of those women.28 For Professor Bridges, this is 
cool relief, and in her view creates a “catch-22” in which the non-
commissioning of women of color as surrogates may be at least as 
problematic.29 While understanding concerns that compensated 
surrogacy may contribute to racial hierarchies, Professor Bridges does 
not think surrogacy bans are the answer. Rather she calls for a more 
transformational social justice project that supports a wide range of 
22. Id. at 1079. 
23. Id. at 1104–12. 
24. Id. at 1123. 
25. Khiara M. Bridges, Windsor, Surrogacy, and Race, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1125, 1126 (2014). 
26. Id. at 1128–30. 
27. Id. at 1152–53. 
28. Id. at 1139–41. 
29. Id. at 1140. 
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families, one that creates richer and more accurate accounts of “good” 
families and that provides legal and social support for those families.30 
Professor Martha Field, who wrote the influential 1988 book, 
Surrogate Motherhood, revisits her original analysis in light of the vast 
changes in technology and family recognition that have taken place in 
the interim.31 Professor Field argues that Windsor does not and should 
not change the constitutional and federal landscape for compensated 
surrogacy. Rather, she argues that surrogacy laws and regulation will 
and should continue to evolve state-by-state.32 As the evolution 
proceeds, Professor Field continues to sound cautionary notes about the 
vulnerability of surrogates, especially in countries where the rule of law 
and women’s equality is weaker than in the United States.33 That is not 
to say that she advocates banning surrogacy, as she rightly understands 
that surrogacy will not stop; rather, it will take place in either a regulated 
or a black market.34 Further, unlike Professor Nicolas, she does not 
believe the law is likely to evolve toward providing any constitutional 
protections for a right to surrogacy.35 
Dean Anthony Infanti continues his exploration of the many ways that 
the federal taxation system exhibits a preference for heterosexual 
marriage and parenting.36 Using the 2013 Windsor decision that the 
Defense of Marriage Act’s differential treatment of same-sex marriage 
for federal taxation regulations was unconstitutional as his point of 
departure, Dean Infanti details the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) 
responsive guidance to same-sex couples. Although the IRS’s response 
was broad and enthusiastic in seeking to put same-sex marriages on 
equal tax footing, Dean Infanti asserts that the regulations continue to be 
strongly heteronormative in their effects.37 
Dean Infanti then goes on to explore how that bias affects federal tax 
incentives for procreation as they apply to compensated surrogacy, often 
the only practical option for gay couples wishing to have children. He 
30. Id. at 1152–53. 
31. See MARTHA A. FIELD, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD (1988); Martha A. Field, Compensated 
Surrogacy, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1155 (2014) 
32. Field, supra note 31, at 1176–77. 
33. Id. at 1174–76. 
34. Id. at 1181–82. 
35. Id. at 1177–81. 
36. Anthony C. Infanti, The House of Windsor: Accentuating the Heteronormativity in the Tax 
Incentives for Procreation, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1185, 1184–87 (2014). 
37. Id. at 1210–26; see also Lily Kahng, The Not-So-Merry Wives of Windsor (work in progress) 
(draft on file with author) (arguing that Windsor’s effects on married same-sex female couples may 
be disadvantageous in many circumstances). 
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explores the primary tax incentives for family formation, including the 
deduction for medical expenses, the adoption credit, and the exclusion 
for employer-provided adoption assistance.38 Providing an in-depth 
analysis of the operation of Section 213, Dean Infanti concludes that 
surrogacy-related expenses will not receive favorable tax treatment for 
many same-sex couples wishing to procreate.39 Dean Infanti understands 
these exclusions as further reinforcing the medicalization of procreation 
in our tax laws and its continued bias in favor of heterosexual families.40 
Professor Peter Nicolas makes a unique and insightful contribution to 
the literature on compensated surrogacy by first narrating his own 
experience of compensated surrogacy when he and his partner 
contracted with a surrogate mother to gestate their child.41 Professor 
Nicolas’ personal experience strongly reinforces both the complexity of 
navigating the current regulatory landscape and the proposition that the 
relationship between the surrogate mother and the intended parents is of 
critical importance for the success of the transaction. As a gay man, 
Professor Nicolas supports opportunities that compensated surrogacy 
provides to those couples unable or unwilling to conceive a child 
through their sexual relationship.42 As a constitutional scholar, he also 
argues forcefully that denying such opportunities to form a family may 
violate fundamental due process or equal protection rights to procreate 
and to have care and custody of one’s children that our Constitution has 
recognized.43 
Mr. Terry Price explores in depth the Baby M44 case that first brought 
surrogacy to the public’s attention in 1986, Washington State’s 1989 
decision to ban compensated surrogacy, and its subsequent 2011 
flirtation with changing that prohibition.45 Mr. Price, an astute legislative 
analyst, provides a rich description of Washington State’s legislative 
history on surrogacy and explains why the state continues to make 
surrogacy a criminal act.46 Noting that technology is outpacing legal 
reform on this issue, and that it has been almost a decade since other 
38. Infanti, supra note 36, at 1215–20. 
39. Id. at 1227–28. 
40. Id. 
41. Nicolas, supra note 17, at 1237–67. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. at 1279–1309. 
44. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988). 
45. Terry Price, The Future of Compensated Surrogacy in Washington State: Anytime Soon?, 89 
WASH. L. REV. 1311, 1312–16 (2014). 
46. Id. at 1318–43. 
 
                                                     
04 - Foreword_Final for Publication.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/16/2014  6:26 PM 
2014] FOREWORD 1075 
states have resolved the legal status of intended parents, Price is 
nonetheless not optimistic that Washington State will change its laws 
anytime soon.47 Washingtonians, like Nicolas, will have to continue to 
travel to neighboring states in order to benefit from their less hostile and 
more reliable regulatory approaches to surrogacy. 
Finally, Professor Julie Shapiro, with her characteristically astute 
insight into the questions that really matter, argues that laws regulating 
compensated surrogacy should not distinguish between traditional (egg 
is provided by the surrogate) and gestational (egg is provided by a 
second woman) surrogacy.48 Professor Shapiro generally supports 
compensated surrogacy, and so seeks to make it available to a wider 
group of people and to protect the surrogate from ill effects of power 
imbalances.49 With this goal, she is rightly concerned that the higher cost 
of gestational surrogacy reserves it for those of significant means and 
also creates an even more asymmetrical power imbalance between the 
surrogate and the wealthy intended parents. Drawing on the growing 
body of important empirical analysis of surrogacy,50 Professor Shapiro 
also notes that the traditional surrogates’ genetic connection to the child 
has not resulted in more custody disputes.51 Rather, as Shapiro and 
Nicolas both point out, the strongest determinants of successful 
surrogacy are the prior screening and counseling of the surrogate and the 
development of a positive relationship between the surrogate and the 
intended parents.52 As Anka sang, the surrogate’s contractual 
performance may indeed be “a lovely way of saying what she’s thinking 
of” the intended parents. 
Professor Shapiro also makes a second and more controversial 
argument: that the surrogate should be recognized by law as a legal 
parent.53 Noting that this is the legal structure for surrogacy in the 
United Kingdom, and that it has worked well, Professor Shapiro sees 
this change as having at least two key advantages.54 One is that it 
reinforces her progressive vision of parenting as not being limited to just 
47. Id. at 1336–43. 
48. Julie Shapiro, For a Feminist Considering Surrogacy, Is Compensation Really the Key 
Question?, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1345, 1347–63 (2014).  
49. See generally id. 
50. Id. at 1362. 
51. Id. at 1360–63. 
52. See Nicolas, supra note 17, at 1248, 1249−55, 1297; Shapiro, supra note 48, at 1366. 
53. Shapiro, supra note 48, at 1365–66.  
54. Id. at 1365. 
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one mom and one dad.55 The second is that it accords a more appropriate 
recognition of the surrogate’s status and increases her power vis-à-vis 
the intended parents in what is otherwise an often asymmetrical 
bargaining posture.56 Professor Shapiro’s position on this issue matches 
the one Professor Field advanced in her well-regarded 1988 book, and 
that she reinforces in her contribution to this symposium.57 
The symposium’s authors have provided us with an outstanding 
assessment of the current state of compensated surrogacy. As with much 
social change, initial fears about compensated surrogacy seem to have 
been overstated if compared to the past two decades of experience. That 
said, the continued pace of technological change, globalization, and 
wealth inequality together require that we remain vigilant in analyzing 
how the next decade of experience will unfold. Moreover, just as we 
have seen with the continuing divergence of public opinion about Paul 
Anka’s song, the public will continue to be highly invested in concern 
about who’s having (or trying to have) babies with whom. As a result, 
the next stages of legal and policy development around reproductive 
issues are sure to continue to be contested and complex. 
 
55. Id. at 1368–69. 
56. Id. at 1367–68. 
57. See FIELD, supra note 31; Field, supra note 31. 
 
                                                     
